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OF AUDITORY SENTENCE COMPREHENSION
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Introduction
Sentence comprehension is like riding a bicycle— a feat far 
easier performed than described. Understandably, most psycho- 
linguistic attempts to characterize the comprehension process 
have resorted to simplification. If— the tacit approach seems 
to be— we can isolate for experimental investigation the most 
basic components of comprehension, then on the basis of what we 
learn we can construct at least an outline model of the process; 
after all, any model can always be enriched.
This paper is an attempt at enrichment of the basic model.
In fact, it is more than that, since it will argue that even the 
most basic model of auditory sentence comprehension must incor­
porate more than the minimal elements to which many descriptions 
have hitherto been confined. Take for example the following 
enumeration of the components of a sentence comprehension model:
The listener must recognize the appropriate set of words 
in the flow of speech directed at him. This will re­
quire him to find a match between some internal repre­
sentation of the way each word sounds and properties 
of the incoming information about the speech waveform.
Once a word is recognized, its meanings must be re­
trieved. If there are several such meanings, the one 
appropriate to the current context must be selected 
and combined with the meanings of other words in order 
to form an interpretation of the entire sentence.
Wherever the appropriate manner of combination de­
pends upon syntactic properties of the sentence, such 
as word order or the groupings of words into phrases, 
these syntactic properties must be determined and put 
to use. (Wanner, 1973, pp. 166-167)
Sentence comprehension consists according to this account of 
three stages— identification of word boundaries, lexical look-up, 
and perception of syntactic structure, or parsing. No argument 
can be raised with the inclusion of these components in the 
model. However, it will be suggested that these three stages do 
not suffice to characterise completely the process of sentence 
understanding. Take for example the sentence
(1) Cassandra is a real genius.
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This sentence may be spoken in a tone of reverence and admira­
tion, in which case it expresses praise of Cassandra. But it 
may also be spoken in a quite different manner, with what is 
known as an ironic intonation contour (nasalized, with heavy 
stress on certain words). In this case it is far from express­
ing praise of Cassandra: quite the reverse. Ironic intonation 
has the effect of producing a conveyed meaning which is the con­
verse of the literal meaning (Cutler, 1974); and there is no 
doubt that a listener would apprehend this conveyed meaning, not 
the literal meaning, of such an utterance; that is, he would com­
prehend that the speaker intended to say that Cassandra was any­
thing but a genius. It is difficult to see how this fact about 
sentence comprehension can be encompassed by a model which in­
cludes only the operations of word identification, lexical 
look-up, and parsing.
Similarly, suppose (2) to be spoken in such a way that the 
primary stress of the sentence falls on "above":
(2) The above sentence was ironically intended.
While the proposition expressed by the sentence can be retrieved 
by the three basic operations listed, an extra dimension has 
been added which they would not retrieve— the implication that 
some unspecified other sentence (or sentences) was not ironically 
intended. If, on the other hand, the word "intended" receives 
the primary stress, the implication changes: the reader will no 
doubt agree that (2) now suggests that the intention was not 
realized. Such variations are called changes in the focus of a 
sentence; it is surely the case that implications of the kind 
they express, like intonationally signalled irony, are computed 
when a sentence like (2) is heard.
The following pages contain some specific suggestions about 
the manner in which the basic parsing-plus-lexical-look-up model 
of sentence comprehension needs to be enriched. One suggestion 
will be the inclusion of a processing stage subsequent to the 
establishment of the literal meaning of a sentence in which this 
meaning may be revised. This stage will be called stage B; 
accordingly, "stage A comprehension" will refer to the construc­
tion of a sentence’s literal interpretation. Most of stage A 
comprehension is accomplished before the utterance has been com­
pleted .
Making Use of Prosody
It will not have escaped the reader’s notice that both 
ironic intent and focus information are intimately bound up with 
the prosodic, or suprasegmental, structure of a sentence: irony 
can be signalled by nasalization, exaggeratedly slow speaking 
rate, very heavy stress, or all of these, while the focus of a
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sentence in general corresponds to the location of the main sen­
tence stress. In order to examine how these phenomena might be 
registered in sentence processing, then, let us consider the 
suprasegmental aspects of speech.
These consist, it is generally agreed, of variations in 
pitch, stress and timing relations. Pitch variation is usually 
arbitrarily defined as variation in the fundamental frequency of 
a signal; the other two dimenisons, however, are not so easily 
circumscribed. Timing, for example, is certainly expressed in 
the relative durations of the various segments of the speech 
wave; but silent intervals that can occur between segments also 
play a role in determining the rhythmic pattern that is an im­
portant aspect of a sentence’s timing. Stress, again, is a per­
ceptual feature which is manifested acoustically by an extremely 
complex interaction between all suprasegmental aspects of the 
utterance, not to mention segmental factors as well; vowel quali­
ty (formant structure) is a segmental phenomenon, but vowel re­
duction, namely a shift in formant frequency from the sounds 
which fall in the outer portions oL the vowel quadrant towards 
those of the center (/a/, schwa), is a phenomenon determined by 
stress level in many languages. (For a comprehensive descrip­
tion of the nature of suprasegmental phenomena see Lehiste, 1970).
Some evidence that suprasegmental factors play an important 
role in stage A comprehension of a spoken sentence has recently 
been collected from studies using the phoneme-monitoring tech­
nique. This is a task in which subjects are asked to understand 
a sentence and at the same time to listen within it for the 
occurrence of a specified word-initial target sound, and to press 
a button when they hear a word beginning with this sound. Re­
action time (RT) to the target phoneme in this task, it is argued, 
is directly related to the difficulty of processing the sentence 
at the time when the target phoneme occurs— RTs are lengthened, 
for example, by the occurrence immediately prior to the target- 
bearing item of a low frequency word (Foss, 1969) or of an 
ambiguous item (Foss, 1970).
It was noticed in certain phoneme-monitoring studies that 
RTs were faster when the target-bearing item itself was an "open 
class" item (noun or verb) than when it was a "closed class" 
item (for example, a preposition or conjunction). It is general­
ly the case that open class words carry a higher level of sen­
tence stress than do closed class words. Accordingly, Cutler 
and Foss (in press) measured RTs to targets on open and closed 
class items while manipulating stress level of the target- 
bearing item independently. They found that RTs were signifi­
cantly faster to targets on stressed items, irrespective of 
word class, whereas removal of the stress differences between 
open and closed class items also removed the RT difference be­
tween them.
It might be argued that this result bears no great import,
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since there are notable acoustic differences between stressed 
and unstressed words. Stressed words are in the main longer in 
duration and higher in pitch than unstressed words, and their 
amplitude is somewhat greater; unstressed words, moreover, 
generally undergo vowel reduction. Thus one might wish to ex­
plain the Cutler and Foss result in terms of acoustic advantages 
of stressed items: heightened intelligibility facilitates iden­
tification of the phonemes, and location of a match for the 
phonemic string in the mental lexicon, thus allowing faster 
identification of the target phoneme in the required word-initial 
position.
That this is not the whole story, however, is demonstrated
by a further experiment (reported in Cutler, 1975). In this study 
a number of sentences were recorded in two intonation versions, 
with the target-bearing item of each sentence receiving high 
stress in one version and low stress in the other. Thus in (3), 
in which the target phoneme is /d/, the target-bearing item 
"dirt11 receives high stress in (3a) and reduced stress in (3b) :
(3) a. She managed to remove the dirt from the rug,
but not the berry stains.
b. She managed to remove the dirt from the rug, 
but not from their clothes.
The stress assigned to the target item was determined, as can be 
seen from these examples, by varying the endings of the sen­
tences to manipulate what is commonly called contrastive stress 
(Bolinger, 1961). The point at which the two versions of each 
sentence vary, however, occurs sufficiently later than the tar­
get for the response button to have been pressed by the time 
that part of the sentence is heard by the subject.
In addition to these two versions of each sentence, a third 
version, spoken in as neutral a tone as possible, was recorded.
In this third version the stress level of the target item was 
intermediate, falling between the high- and low-stress versions. 
The actual target-bearing words were then removed from the high- 
and low-stress versions of each sentence by tape-splicing, and 
replaced by identical copies of the same target-bearing item 
taken from the intermediate-stress version of the sentence. As 
a result of this manipulation, the two experimental versions of 
each sentence contained acoustically identical target-bearing 
items. The two versions differed, however, in the intonation 
contour which preceded them, one contour being consistent with 
the occurrence of a high-stress item at the location of the 
target-bearing word, the other being consistent with reduced 
stress at that point.
If acoustic advantages of stressed items were solely re­
sponsible for the RT advantage of stressed target words in the 
Cutler and Foss study, no difference would be expected between 
the high- and low-stress versions of each sentence, since the
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target-bearing items themselves were acoustically identical. In 
fact, however, significantly faster RTs were recorded for the 
items which occurred in high-stress position; i.e., the stressed 
words maintained their RT advantage, despite the fact that they 
had lost the advantages of greater intelligibility.
The sole difference between the high- and low-stress ver­
sions of each sentence in this experiment lay in the intonation 
contour preceding the target-bearing item. It must therefore 
be assumed that the RT difference reflects an effect of this 
contour variation. We must assume, in other words, that the sub­
jects were making use of the suprasegmental information in such 
a way that their processing of the sentence at the point of oc­
currence of the target-bearing item was affected by whether that 
item was expected, on the basis of the intonation contour which 
preceded it, to carry high or low stress.
Since the RTs were faster if the item was expected to bear 
high stress, processing at that point of the sentence was appar­
ently facilitated in some way by the expectation of stress. A 
reasonable interpretation is that particular attention has been 
directed to locations of highly stressed items. Moreover, the 
effect was produced in this case solely by manipulation of the 
preceding intonation contour, indicating that an active search 
for the locations of high stress proceeds in the form of a 
tracking of the intonation contour. A model of sentence compre­
hension which incorporates a search for highly stressed items 
is obviously more complex than a basic parsing-plus-lexical- 
look-up model. However, the evidence of these phoneme-monitoring 
studies compels us to expand the model in this way.
Semantic Focus
In the introductory section of this paper the notion of 
semantic focus was introduced. Sentences (4) and (5), in which 
upper case letters represent highly stressed items, differ on 
this dimension, the focus of the former being "Felicity", of 
the latter "caviar".
(4) FELICITY eats caviar for breakfast.
(5) Felicity eats CAVIAR for breakfast.
Jackendoff (1972) defines focus as the information in a sentence 
which is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and his 
audience. Halliday (1967) draws a distinction between "new" and 
"given" information, where "what is focal is 'new’ information; 
not in the sense that it cannot have been previously mentioned, 
although it is often the case that it has not been, but in the 
sense that the speaker presents it as not being recoverable from 
the preceding discourse" (p. 204).
Our current problem is the extent to which this notion
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is relevant to the description of sentence processing. Can it 
be said, for example, that in order to understand a sentence it 
is necessary to have identified its semantic focus? If a hearer 
understands (4) and (5) as identical, can he be said to have 
understood them?
The position taken here will be that he cannot. That is, it 
will be argued that focus information constitutes an integral 
part of the semantic representation constructed by the sentence 
comprehension device. Successful comprehension necessarily in­
cludes the knowledge that (4) and (5) are different; further, 
comprehension of (6) will entail that the hearer realizes that
(6) Felicity eats CAVIAR for breakfast?
acceptable responses include (7) and (8), but not (9) or (10):
(7) Yes, she like to indulge herself.
(8) She's on a fish-only diet.
(9) Did you think it was Samantha who did?
(10) No, for dinner.
There is evidence from at least one psycholinguistic study 
that focussed items in a sentence are differentially represented 
from non-focussed items shortly after the completion of compre­
hension. Hornby (1974) presented subjects with cleft and pseudo­
cleft sentences and required them to judge whether a picture pre­
sented for a brief interval beginning one second after presenta­
tion of the sentence accurately reflected the sentence's content. 
He found that subjects were more likely to make errors with re­
spect to the noun phrase in the non-focussed part of the sentence 
than with respect to the focussed noun phrase. For example, a 
subject who had heard (11) would be more likely to respond
(11) It is the girl who is petting the dog.
"true" to a picture of a girl petting a cat than to a picture 
of a boy petting a dog.
Suppose, however, that it could be shown that whether or 
not an item is focussed affects the way it is processed during 
Stage A comprehension. As we have seen, the focus of a sentence 
and the location of that sentence's main stress coincide; would 
it therefore be beyond reason to suggest that the active search 
for the main sentence stress during sentence comprehension is in 
fact a search for the sentence's focus?
If this is indeed the proper explanation for the stress ef­
fect, we would expect an effect of focussing an item in a sen­
tence analogous to the effect of assigning an item high stress. 
That is, we should be able to demonstrate that phoneme-monitoring 
RTs are accelerated if the target word is focussed.
The main problem with such an approach lies in the fact that 
sentence focus and primary sentence stress coincide; stress
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produces an effect on phoneme-monitoring RTs, therefore to de­
monstrate that focus produces an analogous effect it is necessary 
to remove the confounding with stress, to keep item stress con­
stant whether or not the item is focussed. Thus, focus cannot 
in this case be defined as the location of the main sentence 
stress; instead, an alternative means of focussing a particular 
item must be used. Among possible solutions is the use of the 
cleft (e.g., 12) and pseudo-cleft (e.g., 13) constructions, which
are also considered to have a focussing effect (Jackendoff,
1972; Akmajian, 1970).
(12) It was cleft sentences that Portia refused
to utter.
(13) The construction that Doris used most was the
pseudo-cleft.
Two investigations provide evidence for an effect of focus 
in phoneme-monitoring analogous to the effect of stress. In 
the first (reported in Cutler, 1975), focus was manipulated by 
the use of cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences describing simple 
agent-action-object situations; RT to a target-bearing item 
which was clefted was compared to RT to the same item in non­
clef ted position. Since cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences can­
not be spoken naturally without assigning high stress to the 
clefted item, the sentences were not spoken, but instead were 
generated on a speech synthesizer, with which it was possible to 
hold the fundamental frequency and amplitude inputs for a sen­
tence constant, and to use identical durational specifications 
for each occurrence, clefted or non-clefted, of any individual 
item. Thus acoustic invariance of the target-bearing item 
across its various appearances was ensured. The results indi­
cated that focussed (clefted) target-bearing items indeed 
elicited faster RTs than the same items when not focussed.
However, it is unfortunately also the case that varying the 
focus of an item by means of clefting makes it no longer possible 
to hold the item's position in the sentence constant. In the 
sentences used in this experiment focussed items occurred at the 
end of a clause more often than did non-focussed items. Phoneme- 
monitoring latency is known to decrease towards the end of a 
sentence or clause (Foss, 1969; Shields, McHugh & Martin, 1974; 
this effect will be discussed in greater detail below). In two 
pairs of items which differed in focus of the target but not in 
the position of the target with relation to a clause boundary, 
tests showed that the focussed member of the pair still elicited 
faster RTs; nonetheless, these results are suggestive rather 
than convincing.
A recent investigation by Jerry Fodor and myself, however, 
attacked the problem differently. In this study the means by 
which focus was manipulated was extra-sentential; a question was 
asked, immediately prior to the sentence, which directed the
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listener's attention to one or another part of the sentence.
Thus the problem of confounding focus with position of the tar­
get item within a clause was avoided, in that the syntax of the 
sentence remained constant regardless of whether or not the 
target-bearing item was focussed. It was also unnecessary to 
control stress by using synthesized speech; the experimental 
sentences were recorded exactly once, and each was spoken without 
applying particularly high stress to any item.
In each sentence two words were designated as target-bearing 
items, and two questions were formulated for each sentence, one 
of which directed the attention of the listener to that part of 
the sentence in which the first target-bearing item was located, 
while the other focussed attention on the part of the sentence 
containing the second target-bearing item. Thus, (14) could be 
preceded by the target specifications /b/ or /d/, and by the
(14) The woman with the bag went into the dentist’s
office.
(15) Which woman was it that went into the office?
(16) Which office was it that the woman went into?
questions (15) and (16), which focus attention on the two target- 
bearing items "bag" and "dentist’s", respectively.
By means of tape-splicing, four materials sets were con­
structed; each experimental sentence occurred with a different 
combination of target specification and preceding question in 
each set. The splicing technique enabled the same recording of 
the base sentences to be used in each set, so that each subject 
heard an acoustically identical version of each sentence, re­
gardless of which target-question combination preceded it.
If non-suprasegmental cues to the semantically most central 
portions of the sentence can be used in the same manner as supra- 
segmental cues, then we would expect that focussing a word within 
a sentence, by means of asking a question to which it provides 
an answer, would facilitate RT to that word’s initial phoneme.
For the example sentence (14), that is, we would predict that 
RTs to the first target, /b/, would be faster if the subject had 
heard (15) than if he had heard (16), whereas RT to the second 
target, /d/, would be faster if the subject had heard (16) than 
if he had heard (15). Since each subject heard the same recor­
ding of all experimental sentences, acoustic factors of course 
cannot be invoked to explain RT differences.
Exactly the predicted interaction was found. Thus we have 
shown that semantic focus can exercise an effect (on phoneme- 
monitoring RT) prior to the completion of Stage A processing. 
Moreover, by demonstrating an effect of focussing an item 
analogous to the effect of assigning high stress, we have pro­
vided support for the notion that the strategic value to the 
sentence processor of an active search for the locations of high
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sentential stress is that the processor is thereby enabled to 
direct attention to the location of the sentence focus, to the 
semantically most central portion of the utterance. The greater 
attention paid to the stressed and/or focussed elements is re­
flected in shorter phoneme-monitoring latencies.
Does it seem far-fetched to envisage the sentence processing 
mechanism monitoring the intonation contour of an incoming sen­
tence as part of an active search for the sentence focus? Some 
recent work (Allen & 0'Shaughnessy, to appear) demonstrates that 
the acoustic prerequisites for this view are certainly fulfilled. 
Allen and 0 Shaughnessy recorded a large number of sentences in 
which various devices were used to indicate the sentence’s focus, 
including clefting, pseudo-clefting and preposed questions, and 
then measured the fundamental frequency contours of these sen­
tences. They found that all methods of focussing produced re­
liable and similar effects on the pitch contour, with fundamen­
tal frequency accent falling in each case on the element which 
was focussed. In other words, speakers produce fundamental 
frequency cues to the semantically central elements of an utter­
ance— is it surprising that the listener seeks to make use of 
these cues?
Presuppositions, Context and the Interpretation of Irony
The notion of focus is held to be accompanied by a corres­
ponding notion of presupposition (Jackendoff, 1972), the pre­
suppositions expressed by (4) and (5) being that somebody eats 
caviar for breakfast, and that Felicity eats something for break­
fast, respectively. Jackendoff defines presupposition as the 
information which the speaker assumes his audience to share with 
him. Does the conclusion that the identification of sentence 
focus comprises part of Stage A comprehension imply that the pre­
suppositions carried by a sentence are likewise identified during 
this stage?
As with focus, there is evidence that the presuppositions of 
a sentence are available to the hearer at least shortly after 
comprehension has been completed. Offir (1973) tested subjects' 
recognition memory of a sentence which they had heard embedded 
in a short paragraph. She found that changes which had been made 
in the sentence were more likely to be recognized if they affec­
ted the presuppositions carried by the sentence than if they did 
not— even though the sentence was often more greatly changed in 
the latter case. Hornby (1971) found that subjects asked to re­
call cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences may make mistakes in sur­
face structure, but are unlikely to make mistakes about what the 
sentence presupposes and what it asserts.
There exists no evidence, however, that presuppositions of 
a sentence are computed during Stage A comprehension. Note that
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the suggestion of an active search for, and the direction of par­
ticular attention to, the location of the focus implies that 
attention is directed away from the semantically less central 
parts of the utterance. It will be argued that the computation 
of presuppositions borne by these parts belongs, despite the 
intimate relation of presupposition with sentence focus, more 
properly with the interpretation of certain extra-sentential 
factors.
Although there exists no experimental evidence to buttress 
this argument, some circumstantial evidence can be called upon.
A great many sentences do not carry presuppositions at all, 
whereas, in the broad sense of focus that has been used in this 
discussion, every sentence has a focus; in every spoken sentence 
there is a point at which the relative stress level is higher 
than in the rest of the sentence, and this point will always 
correspond with a semantically central portion of the message. 
Thus although each utterance will contain parts which are less 
central, these elements will not necessarily involve a presup­
position, and the apprehension that a particular part of a sen­
tence is less important does not entail that the sentence is 
thereby understood to involve a presupposition.
Note that this discussion has been in at least one respect 
greatly oversimplified. As Morgan (1969) has pointed out, there 
are two distinct types of presupposition, sentential and lexical. 
It is the former type that can be determined by the suprasegmen- 
tal contour assigned to the sentence. The latter type is carried 
by a lexical item, for instance the word "stop", as in (17):
(17) Have you stopped beating your husband?
None of the points raised above apply to the lexical presupposi­
tion; there is surely a case to be made for inclusion of this 
type of presuppositional import in the entry allotted the parti-
$cular item in the mental lexicon. The present discussion will 
continue to confine itself to sentential presupposition.
The computation of presuppositions of a sentence will be 
held to be similar to the computation of contextual effects on 
the interpretation of a sentence. It is surely true that many 
sentences cannot be said to be understood until they are under­
stood in context. The host of a noisy party, interpreting a 
neighbor’s utterance of
(18) I'm trying to sleep.
as a statement of fact rather than as a request to be quiet has 
not successfully comprehended it. Similarly, the ironically 
spoken (1) is misunderstood if it is taken as praise.
However the effects of irony and context on the interpre­
tation of a sentence take place at a level which is certainly 
beyond Stage A. Ironic intonation, as we have seen, produces a 
conveyed meaning which is the converse of the literal meaning,
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i.e., it negates the proposition expressed by the literal read­
ing of the sentence. But the negation of a proposition cannot 
be understood without the proposition itself being understood—  
in other words, successful comprehension of the ironically in­
tended message is contingent upon successful comprehension of 
the literal meaning of the sentence. Likewise, the context alone 
does not lead to apprehension of the request expressed by (18), 
despite the fact that, under the circumstances, the appearance 
of a neighbor in pyjamas amounts to a message in itself; after 
all, the hearer’s reaction would be quite different, if the utter­
ance were (19) or (20) . That is to say, the literal meaning of
(19) May I join the party?
(20) Do you realize the house is on fire?
the utterance must again be retrieved before the contextual in­
terpretation can be applied to yield the final interpretation.
The interpretation of irony, context and presuppositional 
structure does not seem to comprise part of Stage A, the estab­
lishment of a sentence's literal meaning. To account for the 
obvious effects of these factors on the understanding of utter­
ances, it is therefore necessary to enrich the sentence compre­
hension model by the inclusion of a stage, subsequent to the 
establishment of the literal meaning of an utterance, in which 
the literal meaning is embellished or revised in the light of 
extra-sentential considerations— i.e., Stage B.
It is likely that Stage B consists of a number of different 
operations. The effect of ironic intonation in reversing the 
literal meaning of a sentence is presumably the result of a dif­
ferent sequence of operations from those producing the effect of 
context on the interpretation of (20) . (However, note that 
ironic effect can also be achieved by context: when two people 
walk into an empty bar', the utterance (21) will be understood as
(21) Sure is lively here tonight.
ironic regardless of the intonation used.) The identification 
of the presuppositions carried by the sentence, and the checking 
of these against the hearer's knowledge and beliefs, result no 
doubt from a different set of procedures again. It is therefore 
quite possible that Stage B is not a unitary stage, but that 
there are multiple independent serial stages which a basic seman­
tic representation passes through before the sentence comprehen­
sion device is completely finished with it. However, the point 
of these brief remarks is just that comprehension cannot be con­
sidered to be complete once the literal meaning of the sentence 
has been established. Revisions of this representation do take 
place as a result of such factors as ironic intonation and the 
influence of context, although it is not necessarily the case 
that every sentence undergoes such revisions, (It is worthy of 
note that one of the few instances in which such effects would
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be almost if not entirely absent is the processing of isolated 
sentences during a typical sentence comprehension experiment.) 
The stage at which these revisions take place is subsequent to 
lexical look-up and the establishment of syntactic structure, 
but it must nevertheless be considered an integral part of the 
model of the comprehension process.
Implications of the serial position effect
One of the most reliable findings in sentence comprehension 
tasks using RT methodology is that stimuli in the later portions 
of a sentence produce shorter response latencies than do stimuli 
in the earlier portions. Thus, Foss (1969) reported longer 
phoneme-monitoring RTs to targets occurring earlier in the sen­
tence than to targets occurring later, a result also found by 
Shields, McHugh and Martin (1974). Holmes and Forster (1970) 
found that clicks in the second half of a sentence were detected 
faster than clicks in the first half. All of these writers dis­
cussed the serial position effect in terms of facilitated pro­
cessing towards the end of the sentence; Foss successfully dis­
posed of three possible objections: that the effect merely 
reflects the subjects' lower criterion for response later in the 
sentence; that it reflects differential occurrence of target 
items with relation to surface structure phrase boundaries; and 
that it results from a reduction in the number of possible 
structural continuations following target items in the later 
part of the sentence.
A further possible explanation for the serial position ef­
fect arises from the phenomena discussed earlier in this paper. 
In a sentence in which no particularly heavy stress is applied 
to any element, the point at which the stress level will be 
highest will lie at or near the end of the sentence. The expec­
ted semantic effects accompany the suprasegmental: in the un­
marked case, given information in a sentence precedes new infor­
mation (Halliday, 1967). An experimental result which supports 
this explanation is that of Hornby (1972); in a task involving 
subjects' judgements of various surface structure expressions of 
simple agent-action-object sequences, Hornby found that active 
sentences in which the agent was heavily stressed produced re­
sults similar to those produced by cleft-agent sentences, where­
as active sentences in which no heavy stress was applied were 
treated similarly to cleft-object sentences.
It is reasonable to assume that the serial position effect 
in part reflects the fact that the point of highest stress, the 
semantic focus, to which the sentence processor seeks to direct 
attention, lies unless otherwise determined in the last part of 
the sentence. Where sentential stress was not specifically 
manipulated, experiments in which the serial position effect was
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reported can be presumed to have used sentences in which the 
focus occurred at the end of the sentence.
It is unlikely, however, that a focus explanation can ac­
count entirely for the serial position effect. The phoneme- 
monitoring experiment reported earlier, in which focus was 
manipulated by means of preposed questions, exhibited a strong 
serial position effect despite explicit extra-sentential cues 
to the semantic focus. While focus exerted the predicted ef­
fect, RTs to the later-occurring target were overall faster than 
to the earlier-occurring target. It would appear that there is 
some further component of the serial position effect besides 
the search for the semantic focus.
In what way might completed processing of earlier parts of 
a sentence facilitate processing of later parts? There exists 
a considerable body of evidence that just such facilitation does 
not happen when one might on common-sense grounds expect it to 
be particularly useful, namely in the resolution of lexical am­
biguity. Phoneme-monitoring RT is lengthened immediately fol­
lowing the occurrence of an ambiguous lexical item (Foss, 1970), 
and a preceding context which renders only one reading of the 
ambiguous item acceptable does not remove the ambiguity effect 
(Foss & Jenkins, 1973; Cutler & Foss, 1974).
This effect presumably reflects retrieval from the mental 
lexicon of all the readings listed for the particular item. 
Although it may be impossible to use biasing context to limit 
retrieval to only the relevant reading, another kind of facili­
tation from preceding context is conceivable. Imagine, for 
example, that one of the operations of the sentence processor is 
the construction of hypotheses about the content of the incom­
ing utterance (cf. Forster, 1975). The strategic value of such 
hypotheses might lie merely in reducing uncertainty about the 
incoming message, given the degraded nature of the signal upon 
which the speech processor operates. After all, the most sali­
ent and at the same time most amazing fact about speech compre­
hension is its speed, even though in real speech situations 
sounds, syllables, even words are missing from the spoken reali­
zation of the message, the sounds that are present may be dis­
torted or compressed, and the whole signal is, on top of this, 
received often through considerable extraneous noise. The de­
termination of word boundaries in this degraded input, and hence 
of the strings which are to be sought in the mental lexicon, 
might reasonably be considered a highly tentative operation; 
the retrieval of a reading which matched the semantic hypothesis 
constructed for that part of the sentence would presumably en­
courage the processor to accept that interpretation and to re­
frain from trying alternative patterns of segmentation.
Further, the semantic hypotheses could be more specifically 
useful in expediting the choice between alternative readings 
retrieved from the lexicon for ambiguous items. In the
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phoneme-monitoring experiments on ambiguity, biasing context 
exercised a facilitating effect on RT to targets in both ambigu­
ous and unambiguous control sentences. The context effect did 
not remove the RT lengthening due to ambiguity, which we take to 
be a lexical effect, but it did slightly reduce it. On the view 
proposed here, this reduction would be due to an effect at the 
point of choice between the alternate readings.
The serial position effect can be considered to reflect the 
operation of semantic hypotheses in the following way: in the 
early part of the sentence the constructed hypotheses may often 
prove wrong and need to be revised, thus adding to the momentary 
processing load and leading to slower RTs in phoneme-monitoring 
and click detection tasks. As the sentence is decoded, however, 
the hypotheses are more likely to be correct and to need less 
revision, so that less of the available processing capacity is 
taken up with hypothesis formulation and testing, and the detec­
tion of phoneme or click targets can be accomplished more rapid­
ly.
Strong support is provided for this view in the work of 
Forster on the effects of plausibility (reported elsewhere in 
this volume). Subjects asked to judge whether or not a string 
of words is an acceptable sentence of English produce longer 
RTs to sentences which are implausible in content— though com­
pletely grammatical and meaningful— than to sentences which are 
plausible. An implausible input will on the average generate 
more hypotheses before the correct one is hit upon than will a 
plausible input.
That phoneme-monitoring is sensitive to the effects of 
plausibility has recently been demonstrated by Morton and Long 
(1976), who found that target-bearing items which had a lower 
probability of occurrence in a particular context elicited longer 
RTs than items with a higher probability of occurrence in that 
context. If the above view of the serial position effect is 
correct, it might be expected that RT to phoneme (or click) tar­
gets in implausible sentences would show a lesser reduction 
towards the end of the sentence than RT to targets in plausible 
sentences. This hypothesis awaits experimental investigation.
The testing of semantic hypotheses during Stage A compre­
hension is independent of the similar notion of testing of syn­
tactic hypotheses suggested for example by Bever (1970), al­
though the two suggestions are of course compatible. Forster 
and Olbrei (1973) have shown that semantic variables do not sim­
plify syntactic processing; but it is conceivable that the 
reverse may be the case.
Finally, a conception of the sentence comprehension process 
which involves the formulation and testing of hypotheses about 
the content of the input is highly compatible with the notion 
put forward above: that an active search is undertaken for the 
semantically most central parts of the sentence. These elements
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would be of more use than any other in the construction of the 
correct hypothesis; thus it makes eminent sense for a hypothesi­
zing processor to search for them.
Conclusion
It is a truism to state that sentence comprehension is an 
extremely complex process. Nonetheless, psycholinguists are all 
too prone to lose sight of this complexity. A simplified con­
ception of the components of a comprehension model may seem to 
be desirable as a basis upon which research hypotheses may be 
formulated. But an adequate model of parsing and lexical look­
up simply does not constitute an adequate model of auditory 
sentence comprehension.
The research reviewed here has shown that the model needs 
also to take into account the processing of the prosodic struc­
ture of an utterance, which takes at least in part the form of 
an active search for the location of the main sentence stress.
"We have seen that this effect appears to reflect the coinci­
dence of main sentence stress and sentence focus; i.e., that the 
search for the primary stress is in fact a search for the seman­
tic focus. It has been suggested that the comprehension of 
spoken sentences involves the construction and testing of hypo­
theses about the content of the input, and that the location of 
a sentence's semantically most central portion is actively sought 
in order to facilitate the construction of the correct hypo­
thesis. These phenomena properly belong in even the most basic 
model of auditory sentence comprehension.
Further, it has been noted that the proper understanding of 
certain sentences must be based on a semantic representation 
which is not identical with the literal meaning of the sentence, 
and that some sentences bear presuppositions which are demon­
strably available to the listener once the sentence has been 
comprehended. It was suggested that the sentence comprehension 
model be enriched by the addition of one or more stages subse­
quent to the identification of the literal meaning in which 
transformations of this meaning on the basis of various factors, 
some of them extra-sentential, may be accomplished. It should 
be noted that this latter type of enrichment of the model is not 
confined to the comprehension of speech, but applies also to 
reading.
A description of auditory sentence comprehension enriched 
in the directions suggested in this paper may still be a far 
from complete one, deficient in countless aspects. But it will 
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